Will China Colonize And Incorporate Siberia? – Analysis by Rousseau, Richard
Will China Colonize And Incorporate Siberia? 
– Analysis 
By: Richard Rousseau 
June 28, 2012 
In June 2010, the Xinhua News Agency reported that China had leased a total of 426,600 hectares in 
the Jewish Autonomous Oblast (District) – popularly known as Birobidzhan – and the Khabarovsk 
region of Russia to Chinese farmers. This has caught Russian nationalists‟ attention; they have 
called the arrival of waves of farmers the beginning of “the Chinese conquest” of Siberia. 
A floating population of tens of thousands Chinese traders and seasonal workers continually moves 
back and forth across the border, one of the longest in the world. The immigrants settle not only in 
border areas but increasingly deeper into Russian territory, and some backlash is imminent. These 
developments raise several questions for Russia as to the migration‟s impact, China‟s long-term 
plans for Siberia, and potential Chinese dominance in the region. And yet, diplomatic relations 
between China and Russia have never been better. China and Russia enjoy mutual cooperation in the 
spheres of defense, technology, energy and bilateral trade. Why would China take any steps which 
would destroy such mutually rewarding relations? 
China – Russia Relations 
China has allocated a definite place for Russia in its policies: it is primarily a source of raw 
materials and an outlet for goods not suitable for what they consider more discriminating markets. 
Siberia is particularly important due to the natural resources it contains: copper, zinc and other raw 
materials. The region is also well positioned to facilitate land-based transit of various resources from 
Africa and the Middle East that would otherwise have to cross pirate-infested waters. Russia has 
proved itself a stable and reliable trade partner, at least under the Putin and Medvedev‟s 
presidencies. Aside from geography, the sheer number of Chinese willing to invest in the Russian 
economy makes their relationship a natural one. Russia has the resources and markets China needs 
and China the financial capital to infuse much-needed investments into the Russian economy. In 
January 2011, Sergei Luzyanin, deputy director of Moscow‟s Far East Institute, said that Europe 
simply “cannot compete with China in terms of investments into the Russian economy.” 
The pair maintains a business-like relationship and inconvenient issues such as human rights and 
media freedom, upon which western countries at times fixate, do not impinge on their bilateral 
affairs. The United States‟ persistent attempts to indict China and Russia for their support of Iran‟s 
nuclear program have also functioned to tighten their relations. 
China and Russia enjoy mutual cooperation in the spheres of defense, technology, energy and 
bilateral trade. Why then would China take any steps that would destroy such mutually rewarding 
relations? 
International analysts have long hypothesized about the Russian Far East in the wake of increasing 
Chinese inflow. Some conjecture that Chinese economic control over these areas is not an “if” but a 
“when” issue. Others argue that increased Chinese activity in Siberia is the natural consequence of 
Sino-Russian cooperation and that the idea of Chinese expansionism is somewhat exaggerated. A 
third group maintains that while China has long-term goals to dominate the region, it has no precise 
plan and timetable. 
Deceiving Demographics 
The demographic problem is the greatest challenge that now faces Russia. The low birth rate paired 
with reduced life expectancy has the potential to seriously undermine the country‟s future. In 2009 
Russia recorded a positive demographic growth rate for the first time in years. But it remains to be 
seen whether this turnaround will be sustainable, or whether it‟s merely the product of increased 
immigration of ethnic Russians from ex-Soviet republics. 
Approximately six million people live in the entire Russian Far East (Eastern Siberia), while more 
than 90 million Chinese live in China‟s northern provinces. Only about 40,000 to 75,000 of these 
live in the Russian Far East (although, since reliable statistics are difficult to come by, this number 
might actually be larger). Siberia seems an ideal place for China to relieve some of the population 
pressure and overcrowding. Moreover, most experts estimate that between 50 and 70 million 
Chinese peasants lack adequate agricultural lands of the type that can be found in Russia in former 
collective farms, where the Russians themselves are now reluctant to work. 
A decade ago many Chinese workers came to Vladivostok and Khabarovsk to earn some extra 
money with the expectation to return home soon. Today this has changed. In 2006 a report in The 
Asia Times entitled “The Chinese Are Coming” stated that “now every second Chinese arrives in 
Russia” with no intention of going back to China, and that most of them should no longer be 
classified as “free migrants.”Many of them carry false documents and even fake Russian 
citizenships. China has deliberately promoted the migration of its citizens to the Russian Far East, 
fuelling concerns that by as soon as 2025, it will be possible to start talking about “China‟s Siberia.” 
Professor of the University of Moscow, Vilya Gelbras, who conducts research on Chinese 
migration, notes the year 2002 as a benchmark. On the basis of data collected by Russian border 
guards in the Far East in the years 1998-2001, between 450,000 and 490,000 Chinese crossed the 
Russian border and then returned home. In 2002 this number increased by 55 percent. During the 
same period approximately 35,000 Chinese were allowed to settle permanently in Russia. In 2002 
alone, 27,200 Chinese settled in Far East Siberia. In 1998, only 7.8 percent of Chinese immigrants 
said that they wanted to settle in Russia; in 2002, the percentage jumped to more than 35 percent. In 
an article published in Russia in Global Affairs (March-April 2005), Gelbras suggests that “now, 
considering all the information gathered, we can definitely say that Chinese migration to Russia” is 
neither “a spontaneous migration of people” nor some “search for a promised land” but a “specific 
form of the movement of manpower that serves the flow of goods.” Chinese authorities stimulate 
themselves this cross-border flow. 
Such a workforce movement would not be a problem if immigrants assimilated with local 
communities. But this is not the case, and the situation has undeniable parallels with that of Muslim 
immigrants in Western Europe. There is also an array of other problems associated with Chinese 
immigrants, including the smuggling of raw materials to China. Forest products and millions of 
cubic meters of illegally felled trees and lumber are exported to the Chinese city of Manzhouli, 
southeast of Chita, where wood-processing factories can be counted by the hundreds. The Chinese 
have effectively avoided paying taxes and managed to take control of several companies that have 
become de facto monopolies in the food supply. In the Russian city of Blagoveshchensk on the 
Amur River, a 1755-mile-long waterway separating Russia and China, the factory producing Kvass, 
a popular Russian beverage made out of rye bread, is now owned by Li Lihua, a Chinese 
businesswoman. He Wenan, a Chinese entrepreneur, has specialized in the construction of shopping 
centers, along with running the most expensive hotels in town. In Chita, Chinese investors have 
bought a former tank factory and converted it into a truck manufacturing plant. 
All indications show that the Russian Far East is fast becoming (if it has not already become) 
economically dependent on China. Its future is in the hands of the local Chinese, not Russian local 
authorities. The Chinese cultivate the land, which the Russians are not motivated to do on their own. 
Local authorities and businessmen don‟t complain about dwindling Russian manpower beyond the 
Amur River as they can easily replace native workers with Chinese who are willing to work 12 
hours a day or more. 
These short-term economic benefits for individual Russians are accompanied by tangible social 
trends. In the late 1990s, Russians found it unthinkable to marry Chinese, but today, Russian women 
hardly hesitate to take Chinese husbands, who are perceived as harder workers and softer drinkers 
than Russians. 
Scenarios for Siberia 
If Siberia is in fact awaiting a Chinese Future, a number of scenarios might unfold over the next 
decade. The worst-case scenario for Russia is not only the continuation of ethnic Chinese migration 
but a substantial rise of it in response to changes taking place in northern China. Russia‟s Far East 
would then become predominantly inhabited by ethnics Chinese, resulting in a decisive change in 
the nature of a region already far-removed from European Russia. 
Military aggression, which seems highly improbable for now, cannot be totally ruled out in the long 
term. Although it is a fact that the Russian army lacks the latest modern weaponry, historically its 
strength has always lain in its number of troops, not in its cutting-edge technology. At Poltava in 
1709, Galicia in 1914 and Stalingrad in 1942, the Russians did not liberate or retake these lands 
because they had more advanced military technology at their disposal or developed cleverer tactics, 
but rather because they had a large numerical superiority over the enemy. This numerical advantage 
would dissipate entirely in the face of the Chinese armed forces, which are ten times larger. The 
inferiority of Russia‟s conventional forces is also aggravated by the shortage of conscripts, a 
consequence of the country‟s demographic decline. However, with regards to nuclear weapons, 
Russia‟s total of approximately 10,000 nuclear warheads surpasses China„s total of approximately 
240 nuclear warheads. The Russian economy may lag far behind China‟s, but the Russian Army is 
still a frightening force and should not be underestimated. 
For instance, in June and July 2010, Russian armed forces conducted Vostok 2010, a series of 10-
day unprecedented military exercises. These were made up of a set of strategic exercises that 
involved 20,000 troops, up to 70 warplanes and 30 warships from the Far Eastern, Siberian and 
Volga-Urals military districts, as well as the Pacific Fleet. Designed primarily to put the military to 
the test, these wargames were also a warning to Chinese military officials who were present during 
the exercise. Vostok 2010 simulated a response to a possible attack from China. It included the 
firing of live ammunition, simulated airborne assaults and amphibious assault landings. 
A third scenario consists of various actions taken by Russia to counteract Chinese efforts to entrench 
itself in East Siberia. The demographics indicate that sooner or later China will have some 
sociological influence and political clout in the region. Russia may soon become a raw material 
appendage to China should the present trend continue. 
In July 2000, while traveling to the Russian Far East, then Russian President Vladimir Putin 
declared that unless concerted measures were taken, “Russians in the border regions will have to 
speak Chinese, Japanese and Korean within a few decades.” In December 2006, at a meeting of the 
Russian Security Council, he asserted that previous governmental measures had failed to eliminate 
problems, including the progressive decline of the Russian population in the region and the 
imbalance between domestic production and international demand, mostly in neighboring China. He 
also highlighted how the lack of transportation and information networks prevented the integration 
of the region with the rest of the Russian Federation, resulting in its economic isolation. 
Putin‟s priority was to develop an action plan for the development of the energy sector, 
infrastructure, transport, logistics and public services with a view to create new economic 
opportunities, attract investors and incite workers to relocate to the area, halting in turn the expected 
population decline. During Chinese President Hu Jintao‟s official visit to Moscow in 2006, the 
Russian and Chinese governments agreed to cooperate in the areas of trade, agriculture, 
construction, transportation, public utilities, the service sector and the development of natural 
resources. In order to facilitate cooperation and minimize trade disputes in these areas, both 
countries concurred to draft a joint action plan. The result was the “Russia-China 2009-2018 
Cooperation Program,” which emphasizes that China build factories in northeast China and utilize 
raw materials from Far Eastern and East Siberia. It was approved in September 2009 by Presidents 
Dmitry Medvedev and Hu Jintao. Moreover, during a visit to Vladivostok in January 2007, Putin 
said the government would provide approximately US$3.8 billion for the construction of facilities 
and infrastructure necessary to host the September 2012 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) summit in Vladivostok. 
In 2008, at a conference on the socio-economic development of the Kamchatka Krai region in the 
Russian Far East, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev said that there is a need to raise the level of 
industrial production and the inflow of workers because the threat of loss of territory is serious. 
Accordingly, the central government in Moscow and the governor of the Amur Oblast, Oleg 
Kozhemyako, launched a program to lure citizens from the now-independent former Soviet 
republics to depopulated border areas of China. Ethnic Russians living outside the Russian 
Federation territory are estimated at between 20 and 30 million, two thirds of them living in the 
neighboring former Soviet republics. 
Another Russian bid to thwart Chinese encroachment in the Far East is Putin‟s pet Eurasian Union 
project. The Russian-led bloc, established on the basis of the already existing Customs Union of 
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia, would constitute an economic bulwark against both Chinese 
expansion into Far East Siberia and the former Russian/Soviet empires. 
A final possible, converse scenario, which seems to be taking shape, is a deepened Sino-Russian 
partnership, as both countries wish to benefit from the exploration of Siberia and this can be 
achieved, at least nominally, through closer ties. Diplomatic and economic relationships are on a 
solid footing at present and there are few theoretical obstacles to further collaboration, should both 
parties desire it. China can bring in expertise and workers, with Russian consent, to start building 
facilities and populating various settlements, both new and old. Cooperation would especially 
facilitate exploitation of raw materials, which are indispensable for both countries‟ long term 
economic growth. 
Thin Ice 
Sino-Russian relations as they stand today have never been better – the two countries are strategic 
partners in goods and arms trades, and intensive cooperation even occurs at the international level, 
within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the UN Security Council, the BRICS and the 
G20. 
But China‟s encroachment into Russian territory may finally upset this tenuous balance. If Beijing 
does not change the situation, this could push Russia, finally, into the arms of the West. For Russia, 
the advantages of a tactical alliance with China are in fact doubtful. A tenable partner for the 
exploitation of the Siberian deposits would be Japan. However, the problem with this option is the 
standoff over the return of the Kurile Islands to Japan. 
China always showed a marked reluctance for overly warm relations with any one country. So what 
is the significance of the alliance with Russian through the SCO? Chinese action in the Senkaku 
Islands and other disputed sea territories surrounding the Middle Kingdom should make Moscow 
uneasy. The Russians have no guarantee that Chinese rapprochement will last for a long period of 
time and that the strategic partnership will remain the backbone of Russo-Chinese relations. 
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